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-is so rich that it is impossible to do it justice in the space I have available. I shall instead discuss this issue in an abstract, theoretical manner, making little reference to the case laws. The first thing that must be said is that I am therefore ignoring what Gergen tells us would likely be the outcome of a White and Carter case in the US in light of a special rule about advertising unknown (I think) in the UK. But my aim is not, in truth, to state the positive law so much as to say something about the contractual norm that gives rise to mitigation, in a White and Carter situation and generally.
Though the rules that give a claimant an incentive to mitigate are of more restricted applicability than many accounts of the law of remedies for breach of contract would lead one to think, 2 let us accept that mitigation is central to the quantification of damages and that 1 [1962] AC 413 (HL (Sc)).
2 My own chapter in this volume (see ch 000) argues that this incentive is only unevenly generated by 'market damages' in the UK and by the combination of 'cover' and 'market damages' in the US, even though these are the most important of mitigation rules.
2 it is right that it is. The majority in the House of Lords reached their conclusion in White and
Carter only because the dispute was about an election to affirm rather than the quantification of damages. But, of course, the significance of the affirmation in White and Carter was its impact on quantification, and all their Lordships 3 regarded a strong distinction between affirmation and quantification as to various degrees questionable. What is more, though the majority's decision must imply that mitigation can be disregarded, a point to which we shall return, one would have said that the majority's disparate speeches cannot be read as providing coherent explicit authority for doing so, were it not that this is just how they have been read in much subsequent commentary. However this is, the same policy considerations that apply to quantification surely must apply to election. 17 Bomberger (n 12), Cal 2d 614, P 2d 733.
18 White and Carter (HL (Sc)) (n 1) 431.
Comment [MH1]:
The sense of this sentence is a little hard to follow -are any words missing?
ratio (whatever it is) of White and Carter obviously is unsatisfactory, and allows 'thing writ in water' thinking to linger when such thinking really has no place in the law of contract.
Contract legally institutionalises an economic-ie social-relationship, and legitimate selfinterest is normative action pursued within a fundamentally co-operative structure, of which mitigation is a fundamental pillar. 19 This is denied by 'thing writ in water' thinking, the implausibility of the solipsistic, amoral conception of self-interest underlying which is exposed by the shortcomings of White and Carter.
Interpreting White and Carter should not be a matter of seeking to supplant self-interest (London: Butterworths, 1972) 600, described its result as 'grotesque'. 23 Prior to failing in the Court of Session, the pursuer had failed in the Sheriff Court, which handed down its judgment on 15 March 1960. 24 As it was not awarded costs in the Lords, and as it would seem-but one cannot be certain-that it was not awarded costs in the Court of Session, hazardous may not be the right word. Disastrous might be the right word. 
